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With sensitive information about ourselves now distributed across personal devices, people need to make
access control decisions for different contexts of use. However, despite advances in improving the usability
of access control for both developers and users, we still lack insights about how the intentions behind policy
decisions in different contexts of use are shaped. In this paper, we describe how context was incorporated
into an access control framework using a study of how context influences access control decision making.
We describe how the main recommendations arising from this study were used to build context into a policy
editor for this access control framework.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Personal information is no longer locked down in
specific locations, where access control can be
succinctly described. Instead, information about our
habits or preferences is now dissipated across a
variety of devices, such as mobile phones, cars,
and smart TVs. Because our relationship with these
technologies is still inchoate, many unanswered
questions remain about how developers should
build end-user access control management tools
for these device federations, especially given the
variety of physical and social contexts in which these
collections of devices are used.
Improving the usability of policy authoring tools for
both developers and users has been a popular line
of HCI-Security research in recent years. Although
past work has cast light on some of the challenges
in using and developing policy management tools,
reflecting on the pervasiveness of mobile and
web applications uncovers further challenges. For
example, consider the scenario below:
Alice is on her way to meet Justin, an old school
friend. Alice’s directions to Justin’s house are
confusing; to avoid getting lost she requests Justin’s
GPS location, and her in-car navigation computer to
picks the best route. Justin receives the permission
request and, seeing that Alice is running late,
authorises Alice to view his location. A few days
later, Alice is visiting friends in London and again
uses a navigation app to find the best route to their
proposed meeting place. However, because Justin’s
location was the last she used, the application starts
to route towards him instead. By coincidence, Justin
is also in London, and Alice follows the seemingly-
plausible directions. Alice arrives at her destination
and is shocked to find Justin walking out of a building
that, to Justin’s embarrassment, she recognises
as one of central London’s seedier establishments.
Alice’s application, recognising that she has reached
her destination, then automatically checks her into
her new location via Foursquare.
This scenario highlights several of these aforemen-
tioned challenges. First, the situations where such
tools might be used are as much about enabling
freedom of action as they are applying constraints.
Many policy tools have been implicitly designed
for organisational settings where a certain degree
of compliance with organisational norms can be
expected. When people make personal use of ap-
plications, the values and norms influencing policy
decisions may be shaped around personal freedom
rather than information security compliance. Second,
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our access control decisions are influenced not only
by the objects and different (human or machine) sub-
jects, but also by the contexts within which objects
and subjects interoperate. People may make access
control decisions for devices on the move when the
context of enforcement is at home, and vice-versa.
Third, presenting the ability to react to all variables in
a context leads to complexity overload. Too many or
too few options may lead to habituation, and there
is already evidence that such habituation leads to
malware being inadvertently installed on devices.
Yet, at the same time, there are few examples of how
these challenges might be addressed. Designers
need insights about how to tackle the process of
initially deriving a context sensitive policy, and how
such policies might evolve as people’s understanding
of their contexts of use develops.
These challenges suggest that designing policy tools
to meet the security and privacy expectations of
end-users, without compromising their freedom of
action, is easier said than done. Consequently, it
would be useful to understand how people develop
these expectations in realistic situations. By doing
so, we can elicit concepts that influence this decision
making process, and help developers build tools that
help policy authors make context-sensitive access
control decisions wherever they are. To this end, this
paper describes how context was incorporated into
an access control framework. We briefly describe
related work in HCI-Security towards addressing
the problem this paper addresses, before describing
how three factors influencing the elicitation and
categorisation of context-sensitive security policies
were elicited. We conclude by illustrating the
implications of these factors for the design of policy
management tools using a policy editor for this
access control framework.
2. RELATED WORK
(Zurko and Simon 1996)’s seminal work on user-
centered security was, in part, motivated by the need
for usable least-privilege access control. Since this
time, the HCI-Security community has taken a keen
interest in closing what (Norman 1988) describes
as the gulf of execution between the intentions of
users, and the system’s means of implementing
them. Studies into enterprise policy management
tools have gone some way towards closing this gap.
In particular, work by (Reeder et al. 2007) identified
several general policy authoring challenges that
need to be addressed by policy management tool
developers; these include enforcing consistent use of
terminology, making the concept of default rules and
their rationale clearer, and facilitating the grouping of
objects.
(Kelley et al. 2011) highlighted the difficulties people
have devising a priori categories of objects that
remain useful when making policy decisions. Earlier
work on evaluating privacy preference tools identified
similar problems between a priori policy specification
and usage (Lederer et al. 2004). Because they need
to understand the privacy implications of situated
use, Lederer et al. argue that users prefer to carry
out actions with imperfect default settings, rather
than semi-intuitively configuring data on an a priori
basis. The idea that people work off a general access
control policy and vary this by different contexts was
also identified by (Smetters and Good 2009).
Because much of this related work is framed from
the perspective of using policy authoring tools, there
has been comparatively little work on how the
intentions behind policy decisions are formulated,
and how these might be influenced. To glean an
understanding of these intentions, it is useful to
observe how people formulate and decide policy
related actions using both scenarios and contexts
specific to their day-to-day lives. To understand what
these concepts and factors might be then examining
how ordinary users respond to contrived, non-
specific usage scenarios is not sufficient. Instead, we
need to examine how representative stakeholders
make access control decisions based on contexts of
use that are meaningful to them.
3. APPROACH
3.1. Contextual access control in webinos
webinos is a software infrastructure for running web
apps across mobile, PC, home media, and in-car de-
vices (Fuhrhop et al. 2012). Its software architecture
includes policy management components for facili-
tating cross-device access control (Lyle et al. 2012).
Because webinos policy management is based on
the XACML attribute-based access control model, it
is theoretically possible to make fine-grained access
control decisions based on environment attributes.
Unfortunately, while the use cases upon which these
components were based describe the flow of data
between end users and system components, these
are generic and framed in terms of whether or not
users can access device features via applications
running on different devices, rather than where these
devices might be located.
As part of the project, a collection of personas
– behavioural specifications of archetypical users
(Cooper et al. 2007) – were developed to provide
a voice for users and developers impacted by
webinos. While useful for envisaging perceptions
these stakeholders might have about webinos, it
was unclear how their expectations about access
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control might change in line with subtle changes in
physical or social contexts within which webinos-
enabled apps might be used. Without knowing these
expectations, it would be difficult to formatively
evaluate tools for creating and managing context-
sensitive access control policies. When it became
apparent that team members had difficulty even
envisaging user interfaces for context-sensitive
policy management, we decided to explore the
impact of the concept of context on webinos policy
specification and management.
3.2. Methodology
To understand how representative users would
experience access control decisions across multiple
devices and contexts, we ran nine persona-based
participatory design workshops; each workshop was
situated around the characteristics and activities of a
particular persona. Following discussions within the
project team, we were interested in three particular
representative users. The first of these was a web
application developer (Jimmy). webinos would not
be successful if developers did not adopt it, so their
stake in access control decisions would be critical.
The second persona (Clara) represented younger,
teenaged users, because we felt such users were
more likely to adopt new technology. The final person
represented the parent of a young child (Helen); this
persona represented users that had made lifestyle
choices making them sensitive to security & privacy
concerns. These personas are described in more
detail by (webinos Consortium 2011).
Workshop participants were recruited based on how
closely they matched the characteristics of the three
different personas. Participants were presented with
a scenario meaningful to them, and asked to elicit
and categorise types of data that would need to
be subject to access control. For example, Helen
workshops were structured around making decisions
about the security and privacy implications of a
networked in-car entertainment system being used
by her young son while on a long car journey to see
her parents.
Each workshop involved 3-4 participants, and lasted
approximately 1.5 hours. The participatory design
activity revolved around an affinity diagramming
exercise. Affinity diagramming involves participants
eliciting and organising data items, and consolidating
these into groups that are meaningful to participants.
As such, affinity diagramming allows participants
to understand and make sense of data subject to
access control without constraining thinking around
any specific tool or technology.
The affinity diagramming exercise followed a
specific structure. After introducing the scenario and
providing a brief overview of affinity diagramming,
each session was divided into three stages.
In the first stage (object clustering), participants
spent 20 minutes eliciting data objects subject
to access control, writing these on post-it notes,
and affixing the notes to a wall or whiteboard;
these object post-it notes were then grouped under
categories the participants found useful for making
access control decisions.
In the second stage (subject clustering), participants
were required to elicit people (subjects) that
should or should not have access to the objects
elicited in the first stage. Red and green post-
it notes designated parts of whiteboard where
denied and allow objects are organised respectively.
The participants then re-categorised the objects
depending on what each subject should be allowed
or denied access to; this stage took 30 minutes.
After a 10 minute break, participants spent 20
minutes on the final stage (context clustering). This
involved identifying different contexts associated with
the scenario and, for selected subjects, repeating
the subject clustering stage based on each context.
Following this stage, the participants walked through
the affinity diagrams created, after which a short
debrief session was held to find out how the
participants found the exercise.
Audio and visual data was captured for each
workshop. Following each workshop, the workshop
organiser prepared a short report summarising the
event’s outcome and the main themes emerging
from the affinity diagrams and the associated
discussions.
We devised this approach because team members
were already familiar with affinity diagramming
from their previous work developing personas. This
previous work also helped them recruit suitable
participants, based on the workshops they were
organising; these workshops were held in the UK,
Italy, and Germany. Because the experiments were
concerned with the subjects’ behaviour rather than
the affinity diagrams themselves, both the scenarios
could be explained and sessions run in the local
language, as only the session report needed to
be written in English. The report structure guided
participants towards the sort of observations that
needed to be made, and subsequent telephone
conferences helped validate the research being
carried out because it gave team members an
opportunity to present and discuss their results.
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4. RESULTS
Once all the sessions had been completed, the
workshop reports and transcripts were subject to
open and axial coding (Corbin and Strauss 2008)
by team members with experience in qualitative
data analysis. From this coding exercise, 14 refined
thematic concepts were identified. On investigating
the relationships between these concepts and their
grounding in the empirical data, we identified three
main factors that influenced the elicitation and
categorisation of context-sensitive access control
policies: shared working contexts, pre-existing
biases, and expectation based decision making.
4.1. Shared working contexts
Although not formally acknowledged by the partici-
pants, each workshop appeared to elicit and cate-
gorise data within the frame of a working context.
The ability of participants to frame data was medi-
ated by three factors.
The first of these were the nuances in the working
context; examples of these range from varying the
time-frame of a working context through to changing
the family relationship of subjects in a context.
Exploring these shed new light on pre-existing
objects, but also led to considerable discussion,
slowing down the rate of progress.
The second factor was general fatigue. Framing and
re-framing objects and categories within a working
context was time-consuming. In some cases, a
rigorous exploration of objects and subjects in
the working context left participants so tired that
contexts were specified around pre-existing subjects
or locations closely related to the working context.
The third factor was the use of supporting tools
- in particular sketches and check-lists. Sketches
were used in one workshop as a supplement to
the context clustering affinity diagramming to explain
particular subtleties of a context. Mental checklists
and matrices were in a number of workshops to
check the relevance of concepts, or validate a
concept’s inclusion under a particular category.
Although primarily used for concept elicitation and
categorisation, framing was also useful for identifying
concepts and categories forming the basis of
innovation within the general domain. Examples
included the elicitation of commercialisation and
regulatory concepts that might foster improved
security and privacy.
4.2. Pre-existing biases
The ability of participants to frame concepts
and categories was influenced by pre-existing
biases. In some cases, biases led to restrictive
thinking about concepts because of pre-existing
domain knowledge. This was most obvious in the
Jimmy workshops, which centred on specifying
policies for a training course website. Pre-existing
knowledge about how the website was used,
or assumptions about how hardware was setup
appeared to unnecessarily dismiss objects as
disallowed to particular subjects and context. Pre-
existing biases were most evident when considering
the implicit working context during object and
subject clustering. Sometimes, these biases were
re-enforced by participants when discussions were
grounded around a particular frame; these frames
were based on anecdotal experiences of the
working context or when prompted by the facilitating
workshop organiser.
As well as restricting thinking, biases and grounding
also facilitated the elicitation of concepts which
might otherwise have been missed. In almost all
workshops, grounded discussions around particular
working concepts led to the identification of concepts
which were missed during the initial context-free
object clustering stage.
4.3. Expectation-based decision making
The ability to frame concepts was also influenced by
expectations held about the behaviour of particular
subjects. Some of these were formed by pre-
existing biases because participants felt they were
proxy users for subjects under discussion. In
others, participants espoused opinions they believed
subjects might find important, irrespective of whether
they found it important. For example, in one of
the Clara workshops, participants proposed Digital
Rights Management restrictions that they felt content
providers would find useful. In some workshops,
participants felt confident enough in their knowledge
of subject expectations that concepts would be
moved between allowed and denied sections of the
white board or wall by category and, in some cases,
categories would be elicited before concepts, and
subsequent concepts grouped by static, pre-existing
categories.
Expectations were important for envisaging the
impact of policy decisions but, in certain cases,
this also led to scope creep when participant
knowledge of subjects or the domain appeared
to be deficient. One of the factors contributing to
scope creep was generalisation about the problem
domain; this arose due to lack of knowledge
or only a superficial treatment of concepts. The
other contributing factor was generalisation due
to perceived lack of relevance. Examples of this
included collectively grouping “interface” or “service”
technology because they seemed equally relevant
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Figure 1: Prototype for coarse-grained access control
settings interface
to all subjects and contexts, and generalisation
categories for concepts that were disallowed for
particular subjects and contexts. In some cases,
relevance generalisation led to an implicit transfer of
trust onto objects or subjects related to generalised
objects or categories. For example, “administrator”
subjects were, in some cases, given untethered
access to concepts. Similarly, in one workshop,
participants considered a context where a “secure”
terminal might be used by an administrator in an
untrusted location.
5. BUILDING CONTEXT INTO THE WEBINOS
POLICY EDITOR
These three factors informed the design and
development of access control interfaces for a
webinos hub dashboard application. This is not
unlike home dashboards used for broadband router
home hubs. The application was explicitly designed
for what Cooper et al. (Cooper et al. 2007) describe
as a “sovereign posture”, where as much screen
space as possible can be devoted to policy authoring
and editing. This is because, based both on past
work and our results, making sensible access
control decisions for multiple contexts of use can
monopolise users’ attention for long periods of time.
Policy interfaces were sketched using Balsamiq to
explore different interface possibilities. We used the
workshop data to inform information architecture
decisions. For example, when prototyping possible
interfaces for an access control policy editor, we
wanted to create coarse-grained access control
settings, such as that shown in Figure 1. When
considering what these items should be, we used the
categories of objects elicited in the affinity diagrams
created in the workshops. This secondary use of
Figure 2: Adding Environments
design data suggests the value such research can
have given the increasing prominence placed on
research where agility and lightweight techniques
are encouraged, and where collaborating engineers
are encouraged to fake process and focus on a final
product (Parnas and Clements 1986).
As the sections below describe, these editor
changes influenced the design of the underlying
architecture in different ways. For example, the
need to be flexible about incorporating context into
the access control interfaces led to orthogonality
between the API for modifying the access control
policies, and the interfaces users used to interact
with it.
5.1. Context-driven policy editing
We believe the usual order in which policies are
developed – identifying objects and subjects first
and then creating rules based on how they are
allowed to interact in a particular context – should
be reversed. While the workshops were designed
to initially stimulate thinking about objects which
needed to be secured, framing them with a working
context meant that context could not be divorced
from the policy specification processes. For this
reason, we believed it would be more fruitful to
begin the process by eliciting contexts of use before
objects within them, or subjects that use them.
The attribute-based access control framework
used by webinos made context-driven policy
management a possibility by re-using the hitherto
unused environment attributes of XACML. Similarly,
implementing the interface controls for adding
new environments shown in Figure 2 seemed
trivial. However, in practice, implementing these
features challenged many assumptions made by the
designers that specified the architecture, and the
developers who implemented it. For example, while
adding an environment was non-trivial given the
implementation of the XACML model. During unit
testing of the policy editor, problems were found
that exposed developer assumptions about context.
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It was assumed that the definition of context used
by the requestor and resource owner is shared.
However, personas would name environments
using short phrases based on the workshop, e.g.
Peter’s home. Not only would these environment
names be different for the same context that two
personas would share but, developers discovered
the spaces have been implicitly disallowed in the
implementation. This was only identified when it
was observed that requests that should have been
allowed were denied.
5.2. Use supplemental tools for policy creation
and management
Additional tools are needed not only for editing poli-
cies, but also for creating supplemental information.
The workshop results showed that techniques such
as sketches, matrices, and checklists were useful.
Previous work in the HCI-Security literature has also
found that, if supplemented with contextual infor-
mation about policy rules, matrices improve speed
and accuracy when viewing and changing policies
over traditional policy management tools (Reeder
2008). Based on both the literature and the workshop
results, subject/object matrix controls for editing ac-
cess control policies should support supplemental
information to allow policy editors to reconstruct the
frame used by policy developers when creating the
additional policy. This supplemental information may
include multi-dimension matrix cells such as (Reeder
2008), or additional controls to allow the attachment
of image files or design rationale. With this in mind,
interfaces for editing specific permissions were aug-
mented to allow additional textual rationale to be
appended to rules.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented three factors influ-
encing the elicitation and categorisation of context-
sensitive security and privacy policies. Rather than
viewing our study through the lens of a specific tool,
and drawing from a random user sample to carry out
a general policy authoring scenario, we have instead
used participatory workshops to understand the ex-
periences associated with policy decisions. We have
also based our study around scenarios that were
specific to demographics of the participants engaged
in these workshops. Based on these factors, we
have illustrated how context was built into a policy
editor to better understand the design implications of
contextual access control.
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